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ARTICLES
The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld:
A Look at the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act on its Twentieth Birthday
Stanley Sporkin *
During a discussion of corporate bribery, former Ambassador Michael
Skol asked me whether I knew the name the Germans gave to the payment
of a bribe.1 When I said no, he told me the term is Schmiergeld.2 In The
Joys of Yiddish, Leo Rosten supplies definitions for both Schmiere and
Geld. He defines Geld as the German word for money.3 He goes on to de-
fine Schmiere in one of its uses as follows:
* The Honorable Stanley Sporkin, U.S. District Judge for the District of Columbia; for-
mer Director of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission; former General Coun-
sel of the Central Intelligence Agency. The author's appreciation is extended to his interns
for the summer of 1997, Sumeet Seam, Benjamin Means and Miguel Rodriguez, and to his
law clerk, Daniel J. Solove.
'Ambassador Michael Skol was a career official with the Department of State. He is
now affiliated with Diplomatic Resolutions, Inc.
2 Ambassador Skol recently wrote: "Certain nations even make the practice [of bribery]
openly - and unapologetically - tax deductible. 'Schmiergeld' ('grease money') the Ger-
mans call it, and the word even appears as such in their income tax instruction form." Am-
bassador Michael Skol, An Ethical Bonanza: The Caldera Convention and the
Internationalization ofthe FCPA, FED. ETHICS REP. 1 (Aug. 1996).
3 See LEO ROSTEN, THE Joys OF YIDDISH 129 (1968). The Yiddish word gelt is derived
from the German word geld.
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To bribe; a bribe. This is the most interesting usage, and has long been part of
American slang. It is related to 'greasing the palm.' 'Do the officials expect to
be Shmeered there?' There's a saying: 'Az men shmeert nit, fort men nit.' ('If
you don't bribe, you don't ride'-or, less literally, 'Without bribery, you get
nowhere.)4
Somehow Schmiergeld has a better ring to it than the word "bribery."
Whatever term is used to describe the conduct, the fact is that bribery has
been with us since biblical times.
Twenty years ago, the United States unilaterally acted to prohibit the
bribery of foreign officials by passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 ("FCPA"). 5 The FCPA prohibits bribery both directly through its
anti-bribery provisions 6 and indirectly through its accounting requirements.
Through its accounting requirements, the FCPA amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by requiring in part that corporations "make and
keep books, records and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issu-
ers."
7
Many cynics viewed the United States' attempt to ban all forms of cor-
porate bribery as another example of the federal government's taking on the
role of Don Quixote and tilting at windmills. While the law may not have
been taken seriously when it was first enacted, it is clear that it has assumed
a prominent place among our federal criminal laws. According to a recent
article in the Wall Street Journal, the FCPA remains "the world's toughest
law against foreign bribes."9 This article will provide background as to
how the law was conceived and will discuss the law's present and future
status.
4 Id. at 353. The Yiddish word schmeer is derived from the German word schmiere,
meaning "grease" or "bribe."
5 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494, as amended
by Title V of the Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§
5001-03, 102 Stat. 1415, 1415-25 (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2),
78m(b)(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1994)). The response from the private sector was so loud
that in 1988, Congress amended some of the FCPA's provisions. Among other things, the
amendatory legislation made it clear that some ministerial "tips" used to procure administra-
tive acts that the corporation was entitled to by law would not be banned. 15 U.S.C. §§
78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b). Even though there had been a broad assault on the law, the supporters
of the law were able to, in large part, withstand the attack.
6 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
7 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
'For additional background on the FCPA, see A.B. LEVENSON ET AL, CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND THE FCPA (1997); Adam Fremantle & Sherman Katz, The Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, 23 INT'L LAw. 755 (1989); Gary Lynch, Enforce-
ment of the Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 2 FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRAc. ACT REP. 273 (1983) (background material updated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission).
9 Neil King, Jr., Momentum Builds for Corporate-Bribery Ban, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23,
1997, at Al6.
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I. HOW IT ALL BEGAN
In my forty years as a practicing attorney, there is no accomplishment
of which I am more proud than the contribution I made by assisting in the
creation of the FCPA. The FCPA was not the creation of some bureaucrat
who, without provocation, thought that this was a law that should be on the
books. Instead, it came about as a reaction to certain highly questionable
activities of many of our international corporations that became public as a
result of investigations conducted by the United States Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC" or "Commission").
Both the SEC investigations and the idea for the FCPA arose out of
Congressional testimony at the tail end of the famous Watergate hearings.
At the time, I was Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. In those
days, the Watergate hearings were great television fare. In the evening
hours, I followed the daily replays of the hearings very closely. The testi-
mony was absolutely fascinating. To a trial lawyer it was real theater. Af-
ter all the dynamic revelations concerning the President's relationship to
some third-rate burglary, a group of corporate officials testified to the
making of political contributions to President Nixon's re-election campaign.
The corporate officials offered no great revelations compared to those pre-
sented in the testimony of "All the President's Men."
Even though there was relatively little public interest in this phase of
the hearings, the committee dutifully explored the issues raised. A number
of corporate officials testified about impermissible contributions made by
their corporations to President Nixon's re-election campaign. However, the
committee made no searching inquiry into the methodology used by the
corporations to make the payments.
I found the corporate officers' testimony particularly intriguing. My
professional career includes training as an accountant, concluding in my
being licensed as a Certified Public Accountant. After hearing the testi-
mony, several accounting questions immediately sprang to my mind: How
did a publicly traded corporation record such an illegal transaction? What, if
any, information did the outside auditors have?
To satisfy my curiosity, I asked one of my staff members to commence
an informal inquiry to determine how the transactions were booked. The
answer came back shortly. The political contributions were disguised on
the contributing corporations' books and records. At no time did the books
and records disclose that an illegal political contribution had been made.
This was not an oversight; it was the product of careful planning by top
corporate officials who painstakingly designed the methodology used to re-
cord the transactions. In one case, the corporation obtained the money by
setting up two foreign subsidiaries. When top officials were questioned as
to why they used this method, they responded that by capitalizing the pay-
ment, they would not run afoul of the income tax laws because no deduc-
tion would be taken for the payment. In addition, they believed that by
keeping the capitalization small, they would not meet the materiality stan-
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dard for financial statement disclosure. By going this route, they also
hoped to avoid the scrutiny of the corporation's outside auditors who nor-
mally would not sample too many small transactions as part of their routine
audit procedures.
We discovered that the funds were masked in secret mislabeled ac-
counts, and their use was not confined to illegal political contributions. In-
deed, these secret funds were used to make -many other forms of illicit
payments, including payments of bribes to high officials of foreign gov-
ernments. At this point, the inquiry was expanded and soon turned into a
full-fledged formal SEC investigation.
The results of the investigation were staggering. As reported by the
Department of Justice, "over 400 U.S. companies admitted making ques-
tionable or illegal payments in excess of $300 million to foreign govern-
ment officials, politicians and political parties." 10 This included 117 of the
top Fortune 500 corporations.
The caseload mounted. We uncovered enough evidence to initiate
formal actions against some of the nation's most prestigious corporations.
12
The SEC was literally overrun with these cases, and its meager resources
were tapped to the utmost. A creative solution became absolutely neces-
sary.
The SEC's brilliant Chairman, Ray Garrett, and his superb colleagues
(Commissioners Irving M. Pollack,13 John R. Evans, A. A. Sommer, Jr. and
Philip A. Loomis, Jr.) tasked the Division of Corporation Finance's out-
standing Director Alan Levenson and me to carefully review the findings of
the probe in order to see if there were some way the SEC could bring ap-
propriate closure to it.
The solution that we developed was inspired by the spirit of the federal
securities laws. The securities laws have long been a model for appropriate
government regulation. They are largely statutes that mandate transpar-
ency. Full and fair disclosure is the general concept underpinning these
laws. As part of its administration of the federal securities laws, the SEC
relies heavily on voluntary private sector compliance. Thus, instead of re-
quiring government auditors to examine the financial reports of public cor-
porations, that responsibility has been delegated to the nation's Certified
Public Accountants.
With these concepts in mind, Mr. Levenson, with some input from me
and then Commissioner Pollack, came up with the idea of a voluntary dis-
1o United States Department of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provi-
sions, in LEVENSON, supra note 8, at 131.
"' See H.R. REP. 95-640, at 4 (1977); see also Fremantle & Katz, supra note 8, at 755.
12 S. REP. No. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4099.
13 For many years, Irving Pollack was the author's supervisor at the SEC. Mr. Pollack
was without peer. If there were a hall of fame for career government workers, Mr. Pollack
would be one of the initial inductees.
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closure program. I4 A corporation with an illicit payment problem could, in
effect, go to a corporate "confessional." It would be required to publicly
disclose the questionable payments it had made. In addition, it would have
to agree to commission an independent internal investigation to determine
the full nature and extent of its worldwide bribery and other similar ques-
tionable activities. It was contemplated that the results would be turned
over to the SEC and made public.
As the last part of the program, the corporation would have to assure
the Commission that appropriate steps had been taken to insure that such
activities did not recur. Because we did not know whether the so-called
private investigation would have the requisite integrity and objectivity, the
Commission reserved the right to bring formal action. The corporate com-
munity was informally assured, but not promised, that if all went well, no
Commission action would be brought against a voluntarily complying cor-
poration.1
5
To put it mildly, the program was a huge success. According to the
Department of Justice, over 400 corporations took part in the program. 6
Because the SEC's overall enforcement program had been so successful in
this and in certain other programs, we were occasionally called upon by
other government agencies to explain our success.
A visit to one agency was quite interesting. I learned that before taking
action against the deleterious activities of those it regulated, this other
agency would make a broad public announcement about its planned under-
taking, usually based on only the most limited amount of anecdotal infor-
mation. As soon as the announcement was made, those in the targeted
areas, the complying as well as the non-complying constituencies, would
mount a vigorous campaign to thwart the agency's action. With skilled
public relations firms and the able Washington bar, an all-out assault would
be made against the agency from Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol.
In contrast, the SEC generally followed a strategy of determining the
facts before it announced a broad ranging program. As the SEC brought
case after case, it was difficult for the corporate community to mount a suc-
cessful counter-attack. Our political leaders could not afford to take up the
cudgels for a would-be law violator.
Indeed, in the case of the SEC's questionable payments program, Con-
gress specifically came to the Commission's assistance. One of this coun-
try's great national treasures is former Senator William Proxmire of
14 The Program was well received by the Commission, and its members provided helpful
suggestions.
15See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND
PRACTICES 13-17 (1976).
16 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions, supra note 10, at 131. It is my
recollection that the number of "volunteers" might have exceeded 600, with the number of
formal actions being over 60.
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Wisconsin. He was so shocked by what the SEC was uncovering that he
had his administrative assistant Ken McLain phone me to determine what,
if any, legislation could help the SEC to continue to ferret out illicit corpo-
rate activities.
When the call came, I was prepared. Bringing to bear both my legal
and accounting training, I analyzed the various cases the SEC had brought
and came to the conclusion that in no instance was an illicit payment re-
corded in the corporation's books for what it was. The payments were care-
fully disguised. For example, a bribe to a government official was often
made through an agent. The books and records would merely reflect an
"agent's fee." The system of private sector enforcement was thus being
subverted. In many instances, the corporation's public accountants were
outright lied to or otherwise misled.
Most of all, I was amazed that there was no requirement that publicly
traded corporations maintain honest books and records. My research of the
various laws, did reveal that such a "books and records" requirement was in-
cluded in the laws governing this nation's financial institutions. It occurred
to me that if such a requirement was good enough for this nation's broker-
age and banking institutions, why not for its industrial concerns?
I became convinced that what was necessary was a simple law that
would require corporations to keep accurate books and records. In my
view, a corporation would think twice before it recorded a bribe for what it
was. Since bribery is generally considered a crime, it would be virtually
untenable for someone to admit in writing that the corporation is engaging
in such activities on an ongoing basis. Bribery needs secrecy in order to
flourish.17 Thus, I theorized that requiring the disclosure of all bribes paid
would, in effect, foreclose that activity.
When I originally advised the Commission of my view, the members
of the Commission decided that there was no need for any new authority
because the Commission had been successful under its existing disclosure
statutes. However, the Commission's theory had never received a court
test. All of its actions were resolved by the entry of consent decrees and
appropriate undertakings. While corporations that paid bribes might well
have a serious public relations problem, a court test of the issue would bring
different considerations into play. The key issue was the application of the
materiality standard. Not all corporate information requires disclosure.
Apart from information that is specifically required to be disclosed, all
other required disclosures must meet the materiality standard. As stated by
the Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., "An omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to vote."'"
17 It would be quite difficult for a corporation paying a bribe to justify it as not meeting
the disclosure standard.
18 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976).
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The SEC largely predicated its lawsuits on the theory that the illicit ac-
tivities of publicly traded corporations are material and must be disclosed to
their shareholders. There was no question that the theory was a good one,
especially inside the Commission. Outside the Commission, certain mem-
bers of the private bar held other views. They contended that if a corpora-
tion with a billion dollars in assets paid bribes in the low millions, that
conduct would not be material. The SEC theory on materiality squarely
stood up to their contentions. The Commission's position on materiality
was several-fold. In its view, an activity that subjects a corporation to pos-
sible substantial criminal penalties would be important to shareholders and
thus would meet the Northway materiality standard. Moreover, to properly
test materiality, one must look beyond the amount of the bribe. According
to the Commission, one must look to the amount of business that the corpo-
ration would lose if it could no longer use bribery to obtain that business.
In effect, it was the amount of business that was derived from the Schmier-
geld that was particularly crucial to the materiality issue.
Because the Commission had decided not to recommend any new or
additional legislation, I put my idea aside until I received that personal call
from Senator Proxmire. I then advised the Senator that in my view a very
simple one-line statute would be helpful in stopping this activity. When I
told him all that was necessary was a law requiring a corporation to keep
fair and accurate books and records, he was skeptical. However, he had
enough confidence in me to enact my suggestion into law. But that was not
all that Congress did. It also accepted a proposal from the Commission's
brilliant Chief Accountant, Professor Sandy Burton, 9 to add a provision re-
quiring corporations to put in place an effective system of internal controls.
The books and records and the internal controls provisions became the first
part of the statute.20 Senator Proxmire, still not satisfied that such a seem-
ingly benign-sounding provision would be effective, added a specific anti-
bribery provision to the law. This provision explicitly made it unlawful for
a U.S. corporation to bribe foreign officials.21 Congress extended the law
beyond U.S. public corporations and made it apply equally to U.S. private
corporations. The statute contained no materiality standard.
The statute has had a real impact on corporate behavior and govern-
ance. Unlike many other laws enacted by Congress, it is being actively en-
forced. While the events I have described occurred rather gradually and
largely caught the corporate community by surprise, corporate America
subsequently mounted a drive to have the statute repealed or at least drasti-
19 Professor John Burton is presently a professor at the Columbia University Business
School. He was formerly Dean of Columbia University Business School.
20 This provision of the statute amended the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
7811.
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2.
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cally modified. A good many of our corporations whined that they were
losing business to foreign corporations that not only were not precluded
from paying bribes to foreign officials but were encouraged to do so. Other
governments permitted Schmiergeld to be a deductible expense for income
tax purposes. While Congress dutifully listened to the corporate commu-
nity, it did not make the suggested changes. Instead, with some minor ad-
justments, the law remained in effect and is still fully operative at this
time.23
An analysis of the cases brought under the FCPA clearly demonstrates
that the statute has been vibrant. Since its enactment, the U.S. Government
(the Department of Justice and the SEC) has brought about fifty cases under
the anti-bribery section and a large number under the books and records
section of the law.24 The cases are far-reaching. They include an action
against Triton Energy Corporation for the alleged payment of a bribe to
obtain business in Indonesia.25 As anticipated, the books and records provi-
sion with its clear standards has been used more often than the bribery pro-
26vision that presents a more difficult case to prove.
It is clear that the program has been extremely successful. Prior to the
FCPA's enactment, industrial concerns were not required to maintain accu-
rate books and records. As a result, their accountants were easily misled.
This is substantiated by the fact that in at least forty cases, the corporations'
outside auditors were unable to detect that illicit activity was afoot. In a re-
cent Wall Street Journal article reporting on the honesty of the world's
great corporations, the author stated that "U.S. exporters are listed as among
the least corrupt. One reason American companies may be 'cleaner' than
Europeans is the presence of U.S. laws that punish companies that pay
bribes, notably the twenty-year old Foreign Corrupt Practices Act."
27
23 Congress amended the FCPA when it passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988. One of the most important changes was the altering of the requisite state of in-
tent from "knowing or having a reason to know" to knowledge with a "firm belief." For a
detailed analysis of the changes that the 1988 amendments made to the FCPA, see Fremantle
& Katz, supra note 8, at 755.
24 As of 1995, the DOJ has brought actions against 17 corporations and 33 individuals.
The SEC has brought seven actions enforcing the books and records provision of the FCPA
against foreign bribery. Additionally, the SEC has used the books and records provision to
combat illicit activity other than foreign bribery in a large number of cases. See Danforth
Newcomb & Judith Reed, Summary of Cases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, at B-19, B-20 (unpublished article submitted at
the ABA National Institute on the FCPA, Feb. 24, 1997) (on file with author). The author
would like to thank William McLucas, Director of the SEC's Office of Enforcement, and
Peter Clark, Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice,
for their help in obtaining these statistics.
25 SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., et al., Civ. 97-401 (D.D.C. 1997).
26 See infra note 28.
27 Greg Steinmetz, U.S. Firms Appear Among Least Likely To Bribe Overseas, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A9.
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The efficacy of this phase of the law has been enhanced by the recently
enacted Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.28  This Act requires
auditors "to develop systems reasonably designed to detect illegal acts and
to make appropriate disclosure to management and, under certain circum-
stances, to the board of directors when illegal acts are detected."2 9
II. WHERE ARE WE NOW?
In some respects, this is not the end of the story but only its beginning.
There are a number of exciting developments taking place on a worldwide
basis.30 To their credit, the present Administration and certain members of
Congress have embarked on a mission to persuade the rest of the nations in
the world to follow the United States' lead and outlaw corporate bribery.
The major initiative launched by the United States to attack bribery
worldwide has been through the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD"). The OECD consists of a group of twenty-
nine developed countries. In 1994, the OECD approved a recommendation
that its members take meaningful steps to deter, prevent, and combat brib-
ery of foreign officials.31 In 1996, the OECD Ministers adopted the Rec-
ommendation on Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials,
requiring members to consider no longer treating international bribery as a
deductible business expense for tax purposes.32 In June 1996, at the Lyon
Summit, the G-7 committed themselves to combat international corrup-
tion.33 Spurred by the success at the Lyon Summit, the United States again
pushed for a ban of foreign corruption at the annual OECD meeting. On
May 26, 1997, the OECD finally pledged to crack down on bribery in inter-
national business transactions. The agreement commits members to intro-
duce anti-bribery legislation by April 1, 1998 and requires that members'
legislatures approve the anti-bribery legislation by the end of 1998. 34
28 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4).
29 Harvey L. Pitt et al., Director Duties to Uncover and Respond to Management Miscon-
duct, INSIGHTS, June 1997, at 5, 8.
30 For a brief but insightful survey of many recent developments, see Guy de Jonquieres
& John Mason, Goodbye to Mr. 10%, FIN. TIMES (London), July 22, 1997. See also King,
supra note 9 ("Twenty years after the Lockheed bribery scandals launched a new corporate
era in the U.S., countries around the world are about to adopt tough laws of their own to
crack down on companies that bribe to win foreign contracts.").
31 See Skol, supra note 2, at 2.
32 Currently, about half of OECD member countries not only fail to criminalize foreign
bribery, but actually permit companies to deduct it from their taxes. See Competitive Brib-
ing, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1996, at A12.33 See Michael Kantor, Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, The National Export
Strategy: Toward the Next American Century: A U.S. Strategic Response to Foreign Com-
petitive Practices 115 (4th Ann. Rep. to U.S. Congress) (1996).
34 See King, supra note 9.
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On another front, the Administration has strongly backed an Organiza-
tion of American States ("OAS") proposal for an international treaty to
criminalize bribes of foreign officials. In 1996, twenty-three of the thirty-
five OAS member countries signed the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, the "world's first anti-corruption treaty. 35 This required the
twenty-three signatories to criminalize bribery of foreign officials and to
update their domestic legislation to criminalize specific corrupt acts related
to bribery and illicitly obtained benefits.36 The treaty also included a books
and records component somewhat similar to the United States' law.
Similarly, in 1995, the World Bank revised its procurement rules to be
more transparent and to guard against corruption. The World Bank sup-
plemented these revisions with ongoing aid and training for governments'
contracting officials and auditors.3 In 1996, the World Bank took an even
bolder step when it explicitly announced its policy not to tolerate fraud or
corruption on World Bank-financed contracts.38 Anti-bribery amendments
were also approved, requiring severe sanctions against those determined to
have engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices.39
In addition, the Export-Import Bank ("Ex-Im Bank"), the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC"), and the United States Agency for
International Development ("USAID") have introduced anti-corruption
measures. 40 The Ex-Im Bank requires disclosure of "commissions." 41 False
representation can result in sanctions and reporting to the U.S. Department
of Justice.42 OPIC requires OPIC-financed companies to pledge to comply
with the FCPA.43  Failure to comply can lead to sanctions. 4 In 1996,
USAID began requiring an anti-corruption statement on assisted procure-45
ment contracts. This statement prohibits bribery and subjects violators to
possible sanctions.46
In December 1996, the United Nations adopted a declaration against
bribery and corruption in international commercial transactions. 47 Moreo-
35 Kantor, supra note 33.
36 See Lucinda A. Low & Kathryn Cameron Atkinson, Led by the U.S., the World Wages
War on Corruption, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 3, 1997, at B14.
37 See Kantor, supra note 33, at 118.
38/d.
39 id.
4 0 Id. at 120-21.




4 1Id. at 121.
46 id.
47 See United Nations Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions, G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/51/191 (1996), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1043, 1046-47 (1997); see also Low & Atkin-
son, supra note 36, at B15.
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ver, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter proposed legislation that would virtually
mandate that the U.S. Government sanction organizations that engage in
"corrupt practices" that disadvantage U.S. corporations.48 This worldwide
effort is truly an unusual phenomenon. In areas such as this, conduct usu-
ally is governed by the lowest common denominator. In effect, the bad
drives out the good. Indeed, when U.S. corporations first attempted to get
the FCPA repealed, their ostensible aim was to allow our corporations to
compete more effectively with foreign entities. They argued that bribes to
government officials were required to obtain business. This nation's corpo-
rations wanted the opportunity to compete on that basis. Simply put, the
ends justified the means.
The position of the current Administration has been an extremely ad-
mirable one. Instead of the lowest common denominator, it is the Admini-
stration's position that we want our corporations, along with other
corporations throughout the world, to comport themselves on the basis of
the highest standards. It is readily conceded that the United States alone
cannot succeed in this grand experiment without the full cooperation of the
other nations of the world. To obtain a worldwide ban on bribery, it must
be in the interest of each of the nations of the world. In a paper I recently
delivered at the First International Ethics Seminar, I said:
A new worldwide strategy to deal with the anti-competitive global as-
pects of corporate bribery is the one this great conference has under considera-
tion. The proposed solution is to endorse the United States stance and outlaw
bribery worldwide. I applaud these efforts.
We know that seldom does ethical conduct rise to a highest common de-
nominator unless there is strong reason for it, and the influential group behind
it can demonstrate a real advantage to enhancing the standard. I believe there
are many self-interested reasons for following the United States lead.
A law outlawing corporate bribery is an important and necessary step in
achieving an honest and fair global securities market. Right now, corporations
seeking additional capital realize they need access to the United States market
place. If they choose this route, they will have to comply with United States
standards, including its anti-bribery laws.
A continuing countenance of bribery is de-stabilizing to the government
that permits it. As the cases brought by the SEC disclose, many of the compa-
nies bribing overseas were also engaged in deleterious conduct at home. The
many companies that made illicit political contributions show that this is true.
As one executive told me, it is very hard to deprogram your officials in foreign
lands when they return to the United States. I need not list to you the many
governments around the world that have been overturned when their top gov-
ernment officials were revealed as taking Schmiergeld.
48 Senator Arlen Specter introduced the "Unfair Trade Practices Act" in the final days of
the 104th Congress. See Matt T. Morley and Yan Liu, De-Greasing the Wheels of Com-
merce: U.S. Anti-Bribery Initiatives Signal Stiffening FCPA Enforcement, in LEVENSON, sU-
pra note 8, at 26.
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Simply put, a good and effective government requires that its officials be
honest and loyal to the government. When officials are for sale, the govern-
ment is vulnerable to being de-stabilized and it is highly likely that, at some
point, the government will be overthrown. The United States government
stand against bribery worldwide is clearly the correct one. While there have
been some aberrations by U.S. companies, by and large, the law has worked
quite well.
The collapse of the Soviet Union taught us that Communism is a flawed
economic system. As much as anything, the collapse was a tribute to the vital-
ity and superiority of this nation's free market system. Such a system to reach
its heights depends on open and fair competition. When impediments are
placed in the path of an honest competitive system, the system cannot function
as it must. While some try to discredit the U.S. system and want to continue a
race to the bottom, this is not the way to proceed. What society would want to
construct a major bridge, tunnel or public building where the best company for
the job was excluded because it would not bribe a government official to pro-
cure the contract? When that bridge collapses because of faulty work, who is
going to answer that a bribe paying shoddy contractor was hired because he
gave Schmiergeld? The point is the case has been squarely made to outlaw
international corporate bribery. 49
III. WHAT THE FUTURE HAS IN STORE
As we look to the future, it is clear that there is going to be further
globalization of worldwide financial markets. I envision the time when the
United States will be just one of many players in the system. Possibly un-
der such a regime, a worldwide SEC will be created.50 To start, it would
have standard setting authority to be followed by enforcement jurisdiction.
At this point, the United States' role would be similar to that played by the
State of New York prior to the passage of the Federal securities laws in
1933 and 1934. For a worldwide system to be credible, there must be uni-
form standards. A uniform standard on corporate bribery would be a good
place to start. It is in each nation's self-interest to do so.
Little did I realize when the SEC embarked on its so-called illicit pay-
ments program that it would have such an impact on corporate conduct.
The impact of the FCPA on corporate behavior and governance has been
substantial. To meet the law's standards, U.S. corporations have put in
place procedures that assure, as much as possible, the honesty and integrity
of the corporate community. Where there have been missteps, generally
they have been uncovered and redressed by prompt and appropriate external
and internal corrective actions.
49 Judge Stanley Sporkin, Paper delivered at The First International Ethics Seminar (Aug.
6-7, 1997) (on file with author).
50 This new body might be named SECI (Securities and Exchange Commission Interna-
tional).
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Self-regulatory and internal compliance programs have become com-
monplace. The government's costs of policing have been modest. The re-
sults achieved from one minor phase of the Watergate hearings may, at
some point, become the hearings' most significant legacy. This will come
about if one day all the nations of the world take steps to outlaw all forms
of corporate bribery. My hat is off to the Congress (especially to the heroic
efforts of Senator Proxmire) and the SEC for having the fortitude to put into
place such an important and meaningful regulatory program. Only time
will tell wbether all this considerable effort will be able to obtain its ulti-
mate dual objectives of providing an even playing field for all corporations
in the world and, more importantly, ridding the world of Schmiergeld.
